Introduction
The occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US-led 'coalition of the willing', the widening of the 'War on Terror' into Pakistan and Yemen, the 'Arab Spring', and the bombing of Libya all highlight the complex nature of sovereignty within the international juridical order. As the compliant 'native' regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq were legitimized by the 'international' community through 'democratic' elections held under the vigilante eyes of the North American-Anglo occupation forces and their mercenaries, the possibilities for sovereignty in both countries-such as they were-were clearly on the decline. Moreover, the response of Western powers to the recent uprising of Arab populations throughout the Middle East against the dictatorships that have reigned in their countries in the 'postcolonial' period further demonstrate that interventionist wars by the 'West' clearly cannot be considered exceptions. Invasions and occupations-widely treated by major Western intellectual traditions in the late twentieth century as phenomena of a colonial order safely consigned to the past-have emerged as central to global politics in the early twenty-first century, highlighting the vexed nature of sovereignty. Indeed, with targeted assassinations, racial profiling, extraordinary rendition, indefinite detention, security certificates, torture and collective punishment becoming more deeply institutionalized as critical to the governance of Muslims at a global level, they raise some rather urgent questions: What is the nature of sovereignty in the early twenty-first century? Who has access to sovereign status and under what conditions? Most important, given that the colonial order of the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries was predicated upon the sovereign power of Euro-American nationstates and the subjugation of colonized peoples within their respective empires, and given that race was central to the constitution of this coloniality-modernity, what does the 'War on Terror' reveal about the relation between race and sovereignty?
My examination of these questions begins by way of engagement with two highly influential theories of sovereignty, one post-structuralist, the other neo-Marxist. In Homo Sacer, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben traces the development of sovereign power in Western politics (1998) . Drawing on Foucault's theory of biopower and rereading the classical Greek texts, Agamben identifies a central paradox within sovereignty-the 'state of exception'-whereby the sovereign suspends the rule of law. The exception has gradually become the rule, and its capture of 'bare life', that is, life stripped of all rights, lies at the heart of sovereign power. Agamben has famously argued that the Nazi concentration camp is exemplary of this consolidation and expansion of the relation between sovereign power and bare life.
In my reading of Agamben, I argue that despite his interest in the concentration camp as exemplary of the state of exception and the constitution of 'bare life', he does not recognize the camp as primarily borderlands 11:1 structured by the racial logic of power nor its production of 'bare life' as racialized life. Agamben is not only neglectful of the reservation, predating by centuries the Nazi concentration camp, and of the very constitution of 'indigeneity' as 'bare life' (to use his terminology) in its appellation as 'Aboriginality', his analytic frame does not even engage the Nazi camp that interests him as itself structured by the racial logic of power. In other words, the violence of the 'state of exception' has hardly ever been the 'exception' for racialized/colonized peoples within modernity. Foregrounding the figure of the 'Muselmann', the limit figure that was the most abject of the Jewish victims of Nazi genocidal politics, I explore the possible consequence of the forsaking of this figure in the camp: does this forsaking not reveal that divestment of the 'race' embodied by this figure in the desperate conditions of the camp was the condition for the survivors' emergence from the camp as sovereign subjects? In other words, I argue that the sacrifice of the 'Muselmann-within' was not only a critical factor in Jewish survival in the camp (as described so powerfully in the survivors' testimonies) but also to their subsequent emergence into sovereignty-as-whiteness, as 'Europeans', 'Americans' and 'Israelis', that is, as 'Western' subjects.
The second theorization of sovereignty that I engage with is grounded in the historical materialist tradition. In their highly acclaimed book Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that at the end of the twentieth century, the global economic order had transcended earlier forms of imperial domination characterized by the nation-state system (2000) . The new order that emerged, 'empire', was instead defined by postmodern forms of decentralized power with multiple locations, new forms of de-territorialized sovereignty and hybridized forms of subjectivity. Hardt and Negri were generally heartened by the humanitarian commitments of this new form of dispersed and deterritorialized sovereignty.
I argue that although Empire mentions race, colonialism and the Third World in analyzing the trajectory of 'modern' sovereignty, these are quickly brushed aside as matters of a past now transcended by post/ modern forms of sovereignty. Hardt and Negri thus overlook the centrality of race and coloniality to the constitution of 'modernity' and the making of its 'sovereignty'. In contrast to Empire's argument that the 'modern' sovereignty has been transcended by a 'postmodern' sovereignty with the decline of the state-system, I argue that there is instead a fortification of the West and its 'whiteness' (articulated as civilizational-cultural superiority) as an ongoing predatory form of sovereignty. In other words, both Empire and Homo Sacer obfuscate the emancipatory possibilities for revolutionary struggles by reproducing as universalist the pretensions of Western sovereignty and rendering irrelevant the extensive Third World (including Muslim) resistance to this form of sovereignty, which enables the ongoing Western domination of the global order. I conclude the paper by arguing that contemporary struggles for transformation in the Middle East and Central Asia cannot afford to leave unaddressed the racial logic of power that shapes such sovereignty within the global order. 
Sovereignty and the State of Exception
In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben examines the nature of sovereignty and its relation to the human life subjected to it. Drawing on the concept of biopower, he notes that Foucault's formulation is characterized by a rejection of the traditional 'juridicoinstitutional models' of power (1998, p. 5) . Instead, Foucault examines the disciplinary practices that 'penetrate[s] subjects' very bodies and forms of life' as a distinct form, 'biopower', which came to characterize modernity. Foucault's work thus examined '…on the one hand, the study of the political techniques (such as the science of the police) with which the State assumes and integrates the care of the natural life of individuals into its centre, on the other hand, the examination of the technologies of the self by which processes of subjectivization bring the individual to bind himself to his own identity and consciousness, and, at the same time, to an external power' (Agamben 1998, p. 5 ). Agamben, however, disagrees with Foucault that such a clear separation can be made between the juridicoinstitutional and disciplinary forms of power, and it is at their intersection that he situates his study.
Drawing on Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt, Agamben points to a paradox at the heart of sovereign power in that the sovereign is at once 'outside and inside the juridical order ' (1998, p. 15 ) . With the power to suspend the rule of law and to determine what lies outside its zone of sanction, the sovereign 'legally places himself outside the law ' (1998, p. 15 ). The state of exception thus defines the limits of the law, delineating the extent of the juridical order to be regulated. However, through such exclusion, the 'exception' becomes simultaneously and inextricably bound to the law. 1 Agamben argues that sovereignty has been defined as power over life, not only death, since the origin of the Western political tradition, with the distinction between inclusion and exclusion marking its spheres of operation: 'In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men ' (1998, p. 7) . Engaging with the classical Greek theorists, including Plato and Aristotle, he points out that they had no word equivalent to the concept of 'life' as it is currently used. Instead, the Greeks defined two forms of life: 'zoë', which was understood as natural, biological life, and 'bios', which defined political life. Agamben's task, as he sets it out, is to examine how it is that the 'bare life' that is neither zoë nor bios, but that is the innermost secret of sovereign power (that is, life stripped of all protection and absolutely vulnerable in face of sovereign violence) is 'captured' by this sovereign power: '…the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original-if concealed-nucleus of sovereign power ' (1998, p. 6) .
The link between the state of exception and bare life has persisted since the transition from the religious, metaphysical ordering of Western politico-social life to the modern form of sovereignty and borderlands 11:1 Agamben identifies the Nazi camp and totalitarian states as the 'exemplary places of modern biopolitics ' (1998, p. 4) , in contrast to Foucault's identification of the clinic, the prison and the school. Tracing the political status of 'bare life', Agamben draws on the enigmatic figure of 'homo sacer' (sacred life) in Roman law, whom he identifies as the 'protagonist' of his book (1998, p. 8) . This figure of homo sacer-who could not be sacrificed but could be killed with impunity-enables Agamben to differentiate his analysis of biopower from that advanced by Foucault, 2 arguing that the state has been concerned with the 'life' it rules over since antiquity. Biopower is thus not as historically novel as Foucault would have it. Although Agamben traces the historical emergence of the 'state of seige' that justifies the suspension of the Constitution to the French Revolution, the Nazi camp is paradigmatic for the sovereign's capture of 'bare life' as exception and the expansion of this life form from the margins into the heart of the polity (2005) . A number of other contemporary figures are included in his definition of 'bare life', including the refugee without rights and the comatose patient hovering between life and death. It is notable that although Agamben frames his object of study as Western sovereignty, his analysis ends by universalizing this experience of the 'West'.
Agamben's formulation of the 'state of exception' has been highly influential in contemporary analyses of the juridico-political context of the War on Terror. 3 He has argued the Military Order issued by President George Bush (November 13, 2001) regarding the indefinite detention of captured Taliban 'erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being' who becomes 'object[s] of a pure de facto rule ' (2005, p. 3). Drawing on Agamben, many scholars have noted that the designation of the Islamist (and by religious affiliation, other Muslims) as (potential, if not yet actual) 'terrorist' and 'unlawful combatant' has served to strip them of every right and protection offered by the state system and placed them outside the rule of national and international law. As is widely known, the Bush Administration and its allied states decried the Geneva Convention as inadequate for the 'new' forms of warfare of the twenty-first century. Defining the 'War on Terror' as a 'state of exception', these scholars have argued that the rule of law applies to the Muslim bodies designated 'enemies' of Western nationstates in not applying to them: these bodies have thus been incarcerated, tortured, even assassinated by state forces operating above the international regime of rights. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib are often identified as the clearest illustration of the 'zone of indistinction' between the 'state of exception' and the 'rule of law' as described by Agamben. Indeed, Agamben's work has also been used very productively by scholars to study the forms of racial and colonial violence that shape citizenship and target asylum seekers in the post-9/11 era (Perera 2002; Stratton 2011; and Razack 2008) . Drawing on his theorization of the 'camp', and reading 'birth' and 'nation' as signifiers of race, their work has fore-grounded race and coloniality in contemporary geo-politics (Pugliese 2009 ). borderlands 11:1 Yet Agamben's analysis remains deeply problematic, not least in his universalizing of the status of 'bare life' in the claim that the state of exception has become the norm. More often than not, 'bare life' has historically been 'captured' by the logic of sovereign power that is explicitly racial, as has been the constitution of 'bios' (political life) in its incarnation as the rights-bearing citizen, who, historically, has been the white Euro-American subject. Thus Agamben's claim cannot explain why it is that not all bodies-but very particular kinds of bodies-are captured by sovereign power in the form of 'bare life '. 4 In the War on Terror, it is Muslim bodies (i.e. those who 'look' like Muslims), that is, Black and Brown bodies, that are the target of sovereign violence, regardless of their actual juridical status. In universalizing the status of 'bare life', Agamben's analytic frame obscures the actuality that it is primarily Muslims who are today trapped in what he calls the 'zone of indistinction'. In other words, even as Agamben's formulation reveals the relation between bare life and sovereign power in the abstract, it conceals the actuality that the 'bare life' that is the innermost secret of 'Western' sovereignty has been racialized since the violence of its originary constitution, even as it is in the contemporary historical juncture. Moreover, along with the racialization of this 'bare life', the constitution of the 'West'-as the province of sovereign power-likewise remains an articulation of racial-as-white colonial/imperial power.
Once race enters the analytic frame, it becomes evident that the 'state of exception' has been no such thing in the colony, the inextricable Otherside of the 'West' and governed by particular forms of deadly and genocidal violence. Indeed, in the colony that was co-constitutive of the West, the 'state of exception' was normalized, rendered banal in the ordinary workings of power. Achille Mbembe notes, like Foucault, that 'to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty…to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power ' (2003, pp. 11-12) , but then also asks 'who is the 'subject' of this right to kill?' This is a question posed neither by Foucault nor Agamben, yet it remains critical to understanding the raciality of the global project that is Western 'sovereignty'.
Critical race and post-colonial scholars have long argued that the native, colonized as 'savage', was not only stripped of every right in the structure of power-alien to their societies and imposed by the violence of Euro-American powers-but was also constituted as the very antithesis of the civilized-as-political human life ('bios') that was the Western man, and subsequently, the Western woman. In her study of the 'global idea' of race, Denise Ferreira da Silva has argued that 'the knowledge arsenal, which now governs the global (juridic, economic, and moral) configuration, institutes racial subjection as it presupposes and postulates that the elimination of its 'others' is necessary for the realization of the subject's exclusive ethical attribute, namely, self-determination' (2007, p. xiii) . Rejecting the sociological conception of race that centres on the exclusion of people of colour from universality, da Silva instead defines raciality as a borderlands 11:1 strategy of power that creates 'homo modernus', i.e., the modern subject-as-sovereign. She notes this power is constituted through the related constructs of historicity and globality-configured as the nation and the racial-and thus 'populates the global space with a variety of modern subjects ' (2007, p. 12) . In other words, the constitution of 'man' as sovereign subject and his disenfranchised 'others' as less than human reveals the centrality of race to the modern form of sovereignty. The very category of the 'West' is an articulation of the sovereign right to kill, a right entrenched in the racial logic of its sovereignty with its rights bearing Euro-American citizen-subject. The constitution of 'native' life as racially distinct and 'less-than-human' is thus a Western tradition foundational to its forms of sovereignty.
Agamben's identification of Auschwitz as the exemplary site for the state of exception ignores the historical antecedents of the Nazi camp, namely, the Indian reservation in the settler societies as well as the residential schools that sought to 'Kill the Indian, Save the Child' (Churchill 2004 ; see also Monture-Angus 1995); the slave plantation and the Bantustan (Patterson 1985) ; and the native quarters and medinas in the colony (Fanon 1961 ; See also Mbembe 2003) . Even when Agamben mentions some of these antecedents, such as the Algerian war, or the incarceration of Japanese-American citizens, he does so in passing, noting the latter's 'solely racial motivation' but eschewing its political, juridical or economic relevance (2005, p. 22 ). The Indian reservation was designed to be the site for the physical extinction of the Aboriginal, and the residential school for Aboriginality itself through psycho-sexual-cultural genocide; the colony as a 'terror formation' was a space where 'commandment' was the absolute power exerted on the native's life by white settlers, as Mbembe describes it (2001) . Notably, these sites were governed by the logic of racial power such that the 'sovereign' right to kill was concentrated not only in the hands of the colonial state, but also in the hands of individual white settlers, men and women, that is, in the hands of those who might feature in Agamben's analysis as 'bios'. The bodies designated 'Aboriginal', 'slave', 'Black', 'Native', and more recently, 'Muslim' have all been 'states of exception', to use Agamben's term; such designation legitimizes, if not actually invites, sovereign violence, including the violence done by the sovereign's exalted subjects, its nationals. 5 Moreover, even the camp that captures Agamben's interest as exemplary of the state of exception was not to escape the racial logic of sovereignty, for it was shaped by the racial politics of the Nazi regime, committed as it was to 'cleansing' Europe of its Jewish populations. Indeed, the Jewish bodies captured as 'bare life' were specifically marked as racio-ontologically inferior to the German 'Aryan' bodies that captured them for extinction. 6 However, instead of making an argument for the inclusion of colonized peoples as racial objects into Agamben's analytic framework, I examine below how 'race' shapes the very heart of the camp by explicating on the profound presence of the racial in Agamben's own study of the camp, borderlands 11:1 albeit his theoretical commitments remain such as to render this presence absent.
Race, the Camp and Sovereign Power
Describing the concentration camp as a limit situation, Agamben names Auschwitz the 'decisive lesson of the century ' (2002, p. 14) . Directing attention to the 'limit figure' at the heart of this extreme institution, a figure known to the camp's Jewish inmates and their German captors as the 'Muselmann' (i.e. the Muslim), Agamben discusses the relation of the camp's survivors to this figure. The 'Muselmann' was marked by an impending annihilation that was visible for all to see in the figure's utter abjection, it was a figure that signified death, indeed, it was the personification of death itself. Utterly broken and degraded, the Jew in this condition was interpellated as 'Muselmann', defined in this deathly naming as the individual who had given up all hope of survival, who had given up on life itself.
Drawing on studies undertaken by Zdzislaw Ryn and Stanislaw
Klodzinski of the terror in the Nazi camp, studies in which these two scholars concluded that the Muselmann 'documents [the] total triumph of power over the human being' (Sofsky, quoted by Agamben 2002, p. 47 ), Agamben agrees that this figure marks 'the moving threshold in which man passed into non-man' (2002, p. 48) . In this terrible space between life and death, of living death-in-life, the Jew came to know him/herself as a 'Muslim'. Starved and emaciated, with the glazed eyes and stunted movement that revealed his/her near death status, the Muselmann apparently recalled for the German guards and the Jewish survivors of the camps the image of a Muslim in prayer. 7 Why this may be the case is a question Agamben does not pursue. Indeed, Parvez Manzoor points out that not many scholars have sought to engage the memory of the Muselmann, which 'lies buried under Islamophobic myths ' (2002, p. 12) .
The 'Muselmann', who is found to be present 'everywhere' in the Holocaust literature by Gil Anidjar, is also described as 'something like a theologico-political history of absolute subjection ' (2003, p. 140) . 8 Inge Clendinnen discusses this figure as follows:
Many of those assaulted relinquished the struggle and became Muselmanner, 'Muslims', men and women reduced to staring, listless creatures, no longer responding even to beatings, who for a few days or weeks existed, barely-and who then collapsed and were sent to the gas. We can guess [sic] that the term Muselmanner refers to the docile acceptance of one's destiny popularly ascribed to Islam and 'the East'. (Quoted in Anidjar 2003, p. 140) These Muselmann 'were dead but they didn't know it', recalled Elie Weisel (quoted in Anidjar 2010, p. 140) . The notion that the Muslim submits to 'destiny' in a mindless docility prescribed by the tenets of borderlands 11:1 her/his faith is an Orientalist fantasy that erases the experience of the actual Muslim who defines his/her faith as a life-long call to actively pursue the ethical life. Muslims are repeatedly admonished in the Qur'anic text for submission to earthly powers and are instead constantly reminded to submit to none but the transcendental divine (Sardar 1999) . As Manzoor rightly points out, the 'authentic Muslim of history' could not have been the model of the 'Muselmann' of the camp ' (2002, p. 12) .
Moreover, lest one think that the visceral identification felt by the Jewish survivor (him/herself racialized as 'Semite' and 'Oriental') with the figure of the Muslim (similarly racialized as Semite and Oriental) gave rise to a positive expression of this shared experience, that it may have led to an embrace in recognition of their cultural and historical commonalities, the testimonies of the camps' survivors clarify that this was absolutely not the case: 'No one felt compassion for the Muslim, and no one felt sympathy for him either. The other inmates, who continually feared for their lives, did not even judge him worthy of being looked at. For the prisoners who collaborated, the Muslims were a source of anger and worry; for the SS they were merely useless garbage. Every group thought about eliminating them, each in its own way' (Ryn & Koldzinski, quoted in Agamben 2002, p. 43) . The Jewish survivors thus turned away in horror from this monstrous figure of the Muselmann. The emotions these survivors recount experiencing towards the 'Muslim', who represented to them what they could become, indeed, what they had become in the camps, is evident in the testimonies referenced by Agamben.
It was not with empathy then, but with terror-turned-hatred that these Jewish survivors turned away from the Muselmann, revealing that it was the Jew-as-Muselmann who perished in the camps, for as Agamben astutely points out, 'with a kind of ferocious irony, the Jews knew that they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews' (Agamben 2002, p. 45) . What such an extraordinary insight may contribute to the theorization of race and 'bare life' in the camp is left unexamined.
In other words, the Jew who died at Auschwitz did so as a Muselmann; the Jew who survived the camp did so by using every psychic and social resource available to wrench him/herself away from this figure. These survivors speak of their conviction that the condition of possibility for their survival was that they not become Muselmann themselves, they attest to doing whatever was necessary to expunge this Muslim-in-the-Jew by guarding their own humanity in the genocidal conditions of the camp, denying any identification with this haunting, dreaded deathly figure. What is to be made of this acknowledgement that it was by severing the bond of shared humanity with the Muselmann that survival became possible for these inmates who were to leave the camp alive? While the question of survival in the conditions of the genocidal violence of the camp is clearly a very, very complex matter to theorize, I believe that what these survivors attest to about their experience demands attention.
borderlands 11:1
The Muselmann of the Nazi camp was, of course, as already mentioned above, not the actual Muslim, but a phantasm of the Muslim, of the Jew-as-Semite, fashioned in the starkest Orientalist manner. And yet, the Muselmann was the Muslim, symbol of Europe's racial antithesis. This association of the abjection of the figure of living-death with the actual Muslim was not racially innocent, as becomes immediately evident when attention is paid to the other names that also referred to the figure-this 'complete witness' of the camp-including 'mummy-man', 'donkey', 'camel', 'cretin', 'useless garbage', 'cripple', and 'tired sheik' (Agamben 2002, pp. 44-7) . In women's camps, this figure was named 'Muselweiber' (female Muslims) and 'trinkets' (Manzoor 2002) While the Orientalist chain of signification that binds these names to the actual Muslim is unmistakable, it should be remembered that Orientalism is not a discourse that originated among Jewish peoples. In his study of Orientalism, Ziauddin Sardar credits the emergence of this discourse to the writings of the Christian Saint, John of Damascus (c.676-749) and the subsequent popularizing of this discourse to the Crusades, while Edward Said has tied this discourse to the eighteenth century conquest of Egypt, as well as to secularist Western ideology (Sardar 1999; Said 1978) . Indeed, as Sander Gilman, among others, has pointed out, Jews and Muslims were both racialized in the trope of the 'Oriental' within Western imaginaries during the first half of the twentieth century (1986). Some of these scholars have also traced the conversion, Christianization and assimilation of many European Jews in the nineteenth century, as well as their construction of Eastern European Jews as their racial inferiors.
For Hannah Arendt, '…there was not the slightest doubt that Jews had been killed qua Jews' in the camps (quoted in Anidjar 2008, p. 23 ). However, Anidjar contests such a reading by highlighting the racial politics of the Nazi regime. He points out that the Nazis defined the Jews in Europe as a 'race', not only with reference to their religious affiliation 9 ; the Nazis thus had a 'more elaborate' definition, identifying 'as 'Jews' scores of people who had absolutely no relation to Jews, people who made no claims to Jewishness, not because they were hiding, afraid, ashamed or self-hating, but because it would never have occurred to them to identify with any Jewishness whatsoever' (Anidjar 2008, p. 24) . Indeed, many of these Europeanized 'Jews' could not even conceive of the 'death sentence-Jew' as being applicable to them (Anidjar 2008, p. 24 ). Anidjar thus finds Arendt's claim 'unexpected, indeed surprising because it collapses two distinct discursive moments in the extension of the Nazi death sentence' (2008, p. 24 ). The first moment is 'the recognition by the persecuted addressees that there is no escape from that sentence…'; the second moment comes with the realization 'that that to which one is reduced at that moment is what one is…' (Anidjar 2008, p. 24) . Arendt holds to the significance of the second moment as a political principle, namely, '…one can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack' (Anidjar 2008, p. 25) . I draw on Anidjar's critique of Arendt on this point in my reading of the figure borderlands 11:1 of the Muselmann, as well as on the testimonies of the survivors that also attest differently than Arendt's claim might suggest.
Although Agamben acknowledges the Nazi regime's identification of Jewish people for elimination on the basis of their 'racial' inferiority, 'race' features in his frame only as a descriptive category, not as an analytic and theoretical category with the power to transform the founding assumptions of his study. Indeed, most of the 'West' (Euro-America) had shared the Nazi's racial hatred of the Jews-as-Orientals, a hatred written into the immigration policies and citizenship rights of these states.
What the testimonies of survivors referred to by Agamben reveal is that the burden of their rejection of the 'racial' (Oriental)-but not religious (Jewish)-identity imposed on them by the Nazis was borne by the figure of the Muselmann. If this is indeed the case, the survivors' rejection of this figure could be read as defining the Muselmann as the 'real' racial object of Nazi hatred, as the 'real' Semite. As such, the survivors could have projected onto this figure of total abjection their own racialization; indeed, such expunging of their 'race' was described by these survivors as the condition vital to their survival. In other words, turning away from the Muselmann was a condition that enabled the possibility of survival in the camp. In turning away from the 'race' imposed on them by Europe, the survivors confirmed, as it were, the racial logic of sovereignty by displacing this critical difference onto the figure of the Muslim, such that the 'Muselmann' became the name really deserving of the racial hatred of the Nazis. It remains unclear whether the name 'Muselmann' originated among the Jews or the Germans in the camps (Anidjar 2008) , but in their hailing of this figure as Muslim, the Jewish survivors' dissociation from the Muselmann confirmed that they themselves were indeed European, that they were not the real recipients of what Anidjar calls the Nazi 'death sentence'. This splitting of the previously racialized Jew-as-Oriental into the 'Jew-as-European' and the 'Muselmann-as-real-Oriental' can be considered a historical legacy of the Nazi camp; the Jewish survivor emerged as a sovereign subject by abandoning the internal racial object that had been named the Muslim.
Although I am in agreement with Anidjar's critique of Arendt, he does not go quite so far as to recognize that it was in this moment of the splitting of the Jewish survivor in the Nazi camp that the integration into 'Europe', into whiteness, of the Jewish people emerged as a historical possibility. My point here is that while it has been documented that many Jews were already assimilated and even converted into Christianity long before the Nazi camps, indeed, early Zionists debated the consequences of such assimilation, it is the camp that marks the watershed in the subsequent acceptance of Jews as a people into whiteness by Euro-America, by the West. If this is indeed the case, the camp then can properly be named the site of the racial death of the 'Jew-as-Semite', with 'Semite' being the name borderlands 11:1 borne until then by both the Jew and Muslim; the camp can also be named the site of the birth of the Jew-as-white and of the Muslim as the anti-Jew, and, in a perverse kind of manner, both the ultimate hateful 'Semite' of Europe and the hate-filled 'anti-Semite'. The Muselmann can thus be seen to have become a doubled personification, first of the racial hatred of Europe, and second of the terror and death such hatred prescribed for Jews.
Agamben argues that ethics 'begins' in this hated-by-German-and-Jew-alike figure: '…in Auschwitz, ethics begins precisely at the point where the Muselmann, the 'complete witness', makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and non-man' (2002, p. 47) . But both 'man' and 'non-man' remain stubbornly 'Western' in Agamben's analysis, the actual, embodied Muslim in his/her ontoepistemological specificity, is barred from the analytic field. In an act of epistemic erasure, Agamben too turns away from the Muselmann in his ready acceptance of the seemingly innocent explanation that the limit figure of the 'Muselmann' reminded the survivors of Muslims in prayer. Treating the Muselmann as simply concept metaphor, Agamben re-inscribes the historical Muslim as non-human absence, a nonentity in-and-for him/herself.
How did this severing of the relation between the Jewish survivor and the Jew-as-Muselmann who perished in the camps impact the lives of survivors? Their testimonies reveal the immense pain, guilt and shame they felt at the perishing of the Muselmann among them. Identification with this figure led to a 'complete collapse [d] as far as [my] psychological life was concerned', testified an inmate, but disidentification was no less painful, it led to a lifetime of being haunted by the anguish of this tortured figure (Feliksa Piekarska, quoted in Agamben 2002, p. 166 ).
The question of race, made urgent in this fraught figure of the Jew-as-Muslim, embodiment of the innermost secrets and terrors of the racial hatred that was the Nazi camp, demands recognition. Why was it that the religio-racial figure of the Muselmann emerged as the quintessential figure of death, a figure that-already physically incarcerated and destroyed by the Germans-had also to be destroyed psychically by the Jewish survivors who defined this as the very condition of their life? What led these survivors, who were Europeans after all, to 'know' that divesting themselves of the 'race' embodied in the figure of the Jew-as-Muselmann and projecting it onto the Muselmann-as-Oriental was the key to survival? The 'Oriental' Jew had been imagined by 'Europe' as being very much like the Oriental 'Muslim' except, of course, for the religious difference. Could the significance of this religious difference explain the association of the 'Muselmann' with the Muslim at prayer, for such an association would highlight the religious difference between the two? It would be in the act of prayer that the religious difference between the Oriental Muslim and Jew could be most visibly evidenced. If such were the case, the Muselmann, as archetype of the non-human in the Orientalist lexicon that was pervasive in Europe, could be loathed as the real origin and bearer of racial degeneration, and not the Jew, who-as European-was really not quite so abject/object. Anidjar points out that for Schmitt, the Jews were a 'weak' people, with no state or territory of their own. Such a 'weak' people would likely not survive, Schmitt predicted, even arguing that such a people should not survive. Anidjar traces how Jews were written out of history by being defined as 'religious', and thus existing outside the realm of politics. Faced with the choice between annihilation and whiteness, turning the most abject Jewish inmates into the hated figure of the Muslim enabled the Jew-as-European to become 'human' in Western terms, in the terms that were imposed on the Jews by the Nazi regime. Thus divested of the Muselmann, these survivors could emerge from the Nazi camp into History itself, acquiring agency and becoming its sovereign subject.
Agamben recognizes that the relation of the 'witness' to the 'Muselmann' was one of a splitting of the self, what he does not address is the racial logic at the heart of this 'splitting', a process that was the condition of possibility for the re-definition of the 'West' as Judeo-Christian. It is precisely this definition of the 'West' that became a historical possibility with the defeat of the Nazis and the establishment of the state of Israel, a definition that has now become hegemonic in the 'War on Terror'. The Nazi camp, as the site of the destruction of the racial Other of Europe as 'Muselmann', was thus also simultaneously the site for the reconstitution of the Jew as racially similar, that is, the Jew-as-Westernized-Self. The cost of this expunging of 'race' in the Jewish-as-Western Self was to prove devastating to these survivors of the camp, forever haunted by the horrors of the figure of the Muselmann. As for the figure of the Muselmann, as Pugliese has noted in his study of Guantanamo Bay, '…what remains constant across radically different historical and geopolitical uses of the term; [is] that whoever is designated as a Muselmann/Musalman/Muslim is compelled to wear the burden of absolute alterity ' (2009, p. 17) .
Empire and Postmodern Sovereignty
The publication of Empire, a politico-theoretical tract by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, created a sensation in the international left. 10 Integrating the insights of post-structuralism into a Marxism redefined for the twenty-first century, the authors argued that the end of colonialism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the globalization of the world economy had given rise to a qualitatively distinct international order. Characterized by a postmodern form of sovereignty and juridical order, this new formation, 'Empire', had transcended the previous mode of sovereignty organized within the 'modern' nation-state system; 'post-modern' sovereignty was instead de-territorialized and decentred, with no singular power or nation-state borderlands 11:1 at its core. 11 Indeed, the nation-state system itself was on the wane in this view.
Hardt and Negri's position centred on the claim that the development of the global market, with its immense flows of finance, technology, people and commodities, had eroded the modernist sovereignty that was vested in state control of clearly delineated borders. While this form of sovereignty had been indispensable to the historical development of capitalism, particularly in its twentieth century imperialist phase, the end of this form was heralded by the increasing inability of states to control borders, disrupted as these were by the exigencies of globalization. 12
For Empire, modern sovereignty initially emerged in Europe and was subsequently globalized. Rooted in the idea originating within the Roman Empire of 'the universality of the ethical and juridical', sovereignty was tied also to the necessity of a single power maintaining peace and stability while protecting the empire from internal and external enemies (Hardt & Negri 2002, pp. 10-11) . This form persisted through the Middle Ages, and with the rise of modernity, two different concepts of international right emerged: first, the idea of 'treaty mechanism' between states that would reflect the systems and relations of their national spheres; and second, the idea of 'perpetual peace' as an 'ideal of reason, a "light" that had to criticize and also unite right and ethicality, a presupposed transcendental of the juridical system and ideal schema of reason and ethics' (Hardt & Negri 2002, p. 11) . European modernity thus became inseparable from the principles of universality and sovereignty.
Although Hardt and Negri argue that 'modern sovereignty emanated from Europe', they do note that 'it was born and developed in large part through Europe's relationship with its outside, and particularly through its colonial project and the resistance of the colonized' (2002, p. 70) . In this observation, and the many such others peppered throughout the text, colonialism is referenced mainly as historical fact, with little relevance for the theorization of sovereignty. The contention that sovereignty emerged in Europe and was then extended globally, or even that the system of international law was concerned primarily with the regulation of relations between sovereign states has been widely rejected by a number of scholars working on Europe's relations with the Third World. For example, highlighting the relation between culture, sovereignty and the law, Anthony Anghie has argued that colonialism's 'civilizing mission' with its claim of absolute cultural difference from 'uncivilized' natives was the central impetus and sole legitimating force of the sovereignty doctrine, and for the development of the international system of laws that organized relations between sovereign European states and non-sovereign colonized peoples (2005) . 13 Sovereignty thus articulates the relations of force and rivalry extant among imperialist powers. 14 However, with their focus fixed firmly on the centrality of the 'immanent powers and forces' (i.e. classes and class struggle) within Europe, Hardt and Negri identify three key moments in the development of modern sovereignty: the 'radical discovery' of the plane of immanence; the reaction against the transformative potential of these immanent forces and its resulting crisis of authority; and finally, the incomplete resolution of the crisis as sovereignty became vested in a state that 'transcends and mediates the plane of immanent forces ' (2002, p. 70) . 15 In other words, Empire offers a fairly typical materialist narrative of class struggle and the bourgeois overthrow of the rule by 'divine' law that was previously vested in the feudal Church and landed aristocracy, giving rise to the secularist law vested in the state through the legitimating liberal concepts of the social contract and democracy.
Postmodern sovereignty, on the other hand, emerged 'under a single logic of rule' (Hardt & Negri 2002, p. xvii) as the 'sovereign right of nation-states (and the international right that followed from it)' was replaced by the 'first postmodern global figures of imperial right' (Hardt & Negri 2002, p. 4) . Initially 'centred' in the 'supranational role of the United Nations and its various affiliated institutions ' (2002, p. 4) , this form moved to transform national constitutional and juridical processes through the growth of a network of global institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The resulting changes in the global juridical order were indicative of a profound paradigm shift, argue Hardt and Negri: whereas international law had previously been defined by an internationalization of the laws of nation-states, the postmodern juridical order was organized through international institutions that were reconfiguring the domestic laws of the nationstate. 16 The imposition of this global juridical order upon nation-states operates on the basis of 'exception', Hardt and Negri argue, so that it is with the intent of averting various forms of crises (humanitarian, violation of international accords, etc.) that international institutions and states are mandated to intervene in non-conforming societies. As such, power mainly assumes a policing function. Although the UN Charter has always included the right of intervention, Empire argues that its 'postmodern' version is qualitatively different: 'Now supranational subjects that are legitimated not by right but by consensus intervene in the name of any type of emergency and superior ethical principles. What stands behind this intervention is not just a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a permanent state of emergency and exception justified by the appeal to essential values of justice. In other words, the right of the police is legitimated by universal values' (Hardt & Negri 2002, p. 18 ).
The operation of this 'right of the police' and the shared 'essential values of justice' that underpin it are much admired in Empire, which defines this 'new' form of sovereignty as a particularly positive development for the Global South and racial minorities. Where the 'modern' nation-state system had been central to maintaining colonial relations as European powers ruled their colonies from within their Significantly for the theorizing of Empire, Hardt and Negri define the American Revolution as 'a moment of great innovation and rupture in the genealogy of modern sovereignty ' (2002, p. 160) . Exemplifying 'an extraordinarily secular and immanentist idea', they claim, the American constituents thought that only the republic can give order to democracy, or really that the order of the multitude must be born not from a transfer of the title of power and right, but from an arrangement internal to the multitude, from a democratic interaction of powers linked together in networks. The new sovereignty can arise, in other words, only from the constitutional formation of limits and equilibria, checks and balances, which both constitutes a central power and maintains power in the hands of the multitude. (2002, p. 161) Although acknowledging that Indigenous peoples were excluded from the 'expansive' project that was the US Constitution in its foundational moment, and that Black people counted as only three-fifths human in its calculations, Hardt and Negri remain utterly enamoured of this document, in which, they insist, 'liberty is made sovereign and sovereignty is defined as radically democratic within an open and continuous process of expansion ' (2002, p. 169) . In this, Hardt and Negri demonstrate little difference from the intellectual and political perspectives historically adopted by the Euro-American left-from Marx onwards-who typically regret the brutality of Euro-American domination of Third World peoples, yet accept the violence of colonialism and slavery as the tragic yet necessary price for an essentially 'liberatory' trajectory of the Western led project of human progress and emancipation.
Although decentralization and deterritorialization of sovereignty is defined as a key feature of 'Empire', Hardt and Negri acknowledge the 'privileged position' of the US within this order. But they are quick to clarify, 'The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were' (2002, p. xiv) . The contention that no nation-state can be the 'center of an imperialist project' is important, but it hardly justifies the conclusion that 'imperialism is over'. Although the US is a superpower that 'holds hegemony over the global use of force', Hardt and Negri argue that it 'can act alone but prefers to act in collaboration with others under the umbrella of the United Nations' (2002, p. 309 ). The power differential among the UN member states and what this may mean for the nature of US 'collaboration' is not a question that engages them much.
Empire also attends to the question of subjectivity, and the argument here is that that new forms have emerged with the new sovereignty borderlands 11:1 that 'manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged in the imperial global rainbow' (Hardt & Negri 2002, pp. xvii-xviii) . 19 Unlike the subjectivity organized in the imperialist nation-states that policed the 'purity' of identities through the exclusion of racial Others, the new subjectivity embraces multiculturalism. In this analysis, the racial violence of the prison-industrial complex and of the anti-immigrant politics pervasive in the US disappear, to be replaced with the notion of a pluralist de-racialized 'rainbow' ideal, which in actuality has been as ephemeral as it is chimeric.
Although Hardt and Negri reference race and colonialism, they do so only to erode the significance of both through their treatment of 'Europe' as sovereign, pre-existing entity, complete in and of itself. 20 Evading the well established fields of critical race, cultural studies and postcolonial studies that are founded on the recognition that Europe became Europe-that is, constituted itself as a unitary, even if not fully unified, entity-in and through its racially constitutive encounter with its colonized Others, they obscure the ongoing mutuality of this relation that continues to produce 'Europe' (or Euro-America). Further, the US, singled out in Empire as the originary site of postmodernist sovereignty that is open, expansive and inclusive, assumes a very different characterization when it is recognized that coloniality and race remain the foundation for both its expansionary (expansionist!) and inclusionary impetus.
Empire's perspective thus easily lends credence to the reproduction of a number of incendiary fictions, namely that the 'international' community is based on 'shared' ethical values that structure the global order; a nationally disinterested de-territorialized sovereignty mandates international intervention in the name of a universally recognized humani(tariani)sm; and international institutions, including the UN, are the locus of a 'global' form of sovereignty equally accessible to all. The text obfuscates the deeply asymmetrical power relations structuring the global order, as well as the violence that is the only condition of its possibility. Hardt and Negri's theorization of post/modern sovereignty thus dovetails quite comfortably with the claims of the US Administration that the attacks of 9/11 created a 'global' emergency (not a national one for the US), and that both the Afghan and Iraqi states were in violation of the essentially 'superior' and 'ethical' universal values (those decided upon by a predatory neoliberal-democratic order). Such a narrative justifies 'international' responses, which in the case of the 'War on Terror' have led to invasions, occupations and bombings by the US-led 'international' coalition in defence of such 'universal' values.
As noted by Achin Vanaik, '…the terms of discourse have now shifted so dramatically that the language of empire and empire-building can be considered respectable, worthy of a hearing in the mainstream media in the US. Even in Europe, there is a greater willingness than in borderlands 11:1 decades past to talk of the "benevolence of empire" or of the US as the "benevolent" imperial power; of how the expansion of this empire can now be understood as the pre-condition for the 'expansion of freedom ' (2007, p. 1) . While intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Christopher Hitchens have been taken to task for their forthright defence of US imperialism, Hardt's and Negri's covert defence of an imperialism-by-inclusion has been warmly embraced by the Western left.
Sovereignty, Race and the 'New' Empire
The question of sovereignty featured large in the challenges that arose in Afghanistan and Iraq to the US-led Western domination of the Middle East and Central Asia. Despite the popular presentation of the 'War on Terror' as provoked by Islamic 'fundamentalism' with its irrational hatred of the West, the question of sovereignty was clearly central in al-Qaeda's stance against the US, as it was in Saddam Hussein's support for the Palestinians in their struggle against the Israeli occupation of their lands and in Iraq's nuclear ambitions. In founding the al-Qaeda network, Usama bin Laden had announced its commitment to three major causes: ousting US bases from Saudi Arabia; ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine; and lifting the UN sanctions on Iraq. In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was not unconnected to the acquisition of the same by the Israeli state with the sanction of the 'international' community, chief among which are the US, the UK and other major Western powers, themselves in possession of these weapons.
Sovereignty was also the key impetus in the 'War on Terror', driven as it was by the US expansionist bid to globalize its sovereignty, such that it could claim the right of international intervention in the name of protecting its 'national' interests, even if such intervention was to be couched in the language of defending universal 'ethical' values, human 'civilization' or even 'global' justice. The invasion of Afghanistan-presented as a response to the attacks of 9/11-was widely accepted as a 'just' war for which the US-(re)defining itself as the beacon of freedom and democracy-enjoyed widespread international support. This claim of American exceptionalism was to prove central to the Bush and Obama Administrations' view of their manifest destiny, and to their mobilization of their national and 'global' publics to support the War. Indeed, in their wholesome celebration of US constitutional expansionism, Hardt and Negri do nothing to undermine such a claim to exceptionalism. While President Bush defined US exceptionalism in Christian terms and President Obama did so in secular-liberalist terms, Hardt and Negri do so in 'constitutionalist' terms. Such a claim has worked to support the US state's repeated thwarting of the possibility of the UN becoming an internationally representative institution (Bennis 2007) . Indeed, this claim enables the US to construct its national interests as being the same as 'a cosmopolitan universal interest' (Vanaik 2007, p. 11) . US exceptionalism also enables those who oppose its predatory practices borderlands 11:1 to be constituted as a 'global' threat, much as Muslims have been defined in the 'War on Terror'. Moreover, the culturalist lens focused on the Islamist affiliations of the Taliban regime and its Sharia-based juridical order as a 'global' threat allowed the US to garner support not only from elite and mainstream Western populations, but also from many activists in the international left and feminist movements. Anti-war and anti-globalization activists-who might otherwise have been expected to oppose US foreign policy-largely treated the invasion of Afghanistan as the lesser of two evils: the necessity of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying the al-Qaeda network, defined now as not only singularly barbaric, but also as hyper-misogynist, made the war tolerable, if not actually desirable to these constituencies. The sovereignty of the Taliban regime-such as it had been-was deemed entirely disposable due to the 'fanatic' and 'misogynist' religio-cultural identity of the regime. Although some legal scholars and activists defined the Afghan 'war' as illegal at its outset, 21 challenging the US claim to self-defence 22 and pointing out that not even the Bush Administration could make the case that the Taliban had been involved in the 9/11 attacks, 23 these were lone perspectives quickly silenced by the overwhelming media and public support for the invasion and occupation. Indeed, even the Taliban's offer to the US to turn over Usama bin Laden upon provision of evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks was publicly ridiculed by the political left as readily as it was by the right. The international order's 'commitment' to the rule to law was put aside simply because the 'West' deemed the Taliban to be culturally untrustworthy.
In contrast to Afghanistan, the invasion and occupation of Iraq generated a different public and legalistic response, but not with regard to race or coloniality. Although the differences between the two countries were stark, the racial logic of power that re-inscribed their 'fanatic' nature (religio-cultural in the case of Afghanistan and 'evil'cultural in the case of Iraq) allowed for their 'sovereign' status to be disposed of in the same way. Where the Taliban had been judged guilty by its own nature (barbaric) and its association with terrorists (the al-Qaeda network), public scepticism was strong outside the US regarding Saddam Hussein's links to al-Qaeda and his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Yet Saddam Hussein, like the Taliban, became the 'evil' that had to be destroyed. Where the Taliban was a self-defined Islamist movement that had emerged in a country impoverished and devastated by the Soviet Occupation and the subsequent civil wars, Iraq was economically well developed, with a highly educated population and one of the most secularized of the Middle Eastern countries. Yet both were deemed too recalcitrant to be dealt with in any other manner than through violence. Where the Taliban banned women from urban public spaces and prohibited their employment outside the home, women in Iraq were highly educated, integrated into the workforce and public life to a degree unequalled in many other parts of the world. Yet both societies were defined as particularly oppressive of women and innately hostile to gender borderlands 11:1 equity. It is notable that, reeling from the effects of the punishing sanctions imposed by the US and the UK under the auspices of the United Nations after the first Gulf War, the Iraqi population did have widespread sympathy around the world before the US-led occupation. Yet such sympathy did not stop the Iraqi population being popularly defined as irrationally sectarian, riven by religious fanaticism and prone to murderous civil war immediately after the invasion.
Within such a politico-cultural framing of the 'enemy' in the 'War on Terror', questions about the legality and illegality of the two wars were shunted aside as the question of Islamist 'terror' and 'misogyny' that was said to emanate from both countries moved centre stage. The occupations of both countries were accepted as necessary for the protection of Western civilization, women's rights and human freedom. In the US, Vice President Cheney publicly defended going over to the 'dark side' to defeat an enemy so 'evil' that any and every measure to eliminate it was not only valid, but absolutely necessary (Mayer 2008) . In the UK, the Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair supported such a view, as did the Canadian Liberal government, including the soon-tobe leader of that party, Michael Ignatieff. In short, the 'nature' of Muslim/Islamist movements is defined as so heinous that neoconservatives, neo-liberals and social democrats all made common cause despite their otherwise divergent political and socio-economic commitments. And if political elites sought to contain public discussion within the culturalist logic of an epic 'clash of civilizations', the left, anti-war and feminist movements in the West no less myopically presented their otherwise sophisticated critiques of US foreign policy, imperialism and patriarchy within an equally simplistic formulation of the 'clash of fundamentalisms' or the 'clash of patriarchies'.
Colonial violence, imperialist domination and racial hatred have cohered around Islam and the racialized figure of the Muslim as the imperialist wars of the early twenty-first century are being fought in the Middle Eastern and Central Asian resource rich and strategically important countries in a number of distinct ways. The first among these was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, namely, the invasion and occupation of the 'deviant' nation-state. The ideological basis for this model is that the nation-state presents either an immanent danger or a staging ground for campaigns of terror against the West-as-global-community. In this model, war and occupation are waged not only by the armed forces of the aggressive powers but are also privatized so that corporate mercenaries undertake combat, intelligence gathering and 'reconstruction' missions to supplement military action. Donor agencies and NGOs also play a major role in such endeavours that are aimed specifically at domesticating and modernizing populations living under occupation. The racial construct of evil, violence prone and recalcitrant natives, the use of overwhelming violence and the civilizing discourse deployed in this model reveal its all too familiar racial logic that buttresses the enactment of sovereign power. However, given that both the costs of this model and the resistance it has generated have been much borderlands 11:1 higher than anticipated, it is unlikely that this model will soon be replicated.
The second model was that evidenced in Libya, which deployed both internal and external intervention. Here, the West's definition of the postcolonial state as monstrous with a simultaneous identification of certain sectors of its population as 'civilizable' (the freedom loving 'rebel' groups) enabled the US-NATO led coalition to intervene to destroy the state and instigate/escalate civil war by arming select forces within the population. The immense air power of the 'international' community is used to destroy key institutions in order for the favoured groups to come to power. The ideological justification in such a case is the definition of the state being targeted as barbaric, preparing to wage mass violence against its own population. 24 The Syrian situation provides yet another unfolding case for the deployment of this particular model.
A final model, involving covert Western support for strategically located states to crush popular movements within their countries, is demonstrated by the recent cases of Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. If overt external support for the postcolonial state fails and it is unable to hold onto its power against popular resistance movements within its domain (as was the case in Egypt), then covert aid is provided to the new factions within the old state who come to power by allying with these movements. This 'support' helps shape the particular agendas of the chosen factions and derails the possibility for revolutionary change. The different aspects of these emergent multi-pronged responses by sovereign Western states to struggles for sovereignty in the Middle East and Central Asia demonstrate that colonialism and imperialism are far from over.
The Afghan war was popularly accepted as 'just', the Iraqi one widely declaimed as 'unjust' though not completely unnecessary, the bombing of Libya as 'humanitarian'. One claimed international legal sanction having secured a vague UN resolution, the other failed to commandeer a similar pronouncement, the third rested on the supposed imposition of a no-fly zone which ended with the destruction of the state's key institutions. One regime came to be defined as 'medieval' and Islamist, the other unmistakably secularist and 'modern', the third crazed and rogue. Despite these significant differences, the common ground upon which the 'sovereignty' of all three could be destroyed so cavalierly, and with such ready compliance from the 'international' community, was their religio-racial constitution as inherently fanatic and thus a danger to the global community of the civilized. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya demonstrate that what appears to Hardt and Negri to be a 'new' form of sovereignty reproduces-at a different historical juncture-the very structures of imperialist sovereignty born in colonial violence. 25 Likewise, the increasing cases of rendition, torture, collective punishment and targeted assassinations demonstrate that it is very particular kinds of bodies that are captured in the 'state of exception' as 'bare life'. Certainly Hardt and Negri recognize that Empire's new constitution is still in process, but by eliding the centrality of race, coloniality and violence, their theory sutures over the integrally flawed and deeply asymmetrical meanings of concepts such as sovereignty, 'global justice' or 'global juridical order'. These concepts were born in and work to reconsolidate the racial logic of power in response to the various crises coloniality gives rise to within the global order.
Moreover, Hardt and Negri's 'rainbow' subject-citizens have shown little hesitation in destroying the humanity of their racial Others as they assert their access to sovereign status, its rights and entitlements. This murderous dynamic has come to the fore of global politics once again in the 'War on Terror', waged by Western states as well as their nationals, against Muslims, who are as excluded from Hardt and Negri's concept of the 'multitude' as they are from the US nationstate's concept of the 'civilized' citizen-as-human subject.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Empire and Homo Sacer contribute to the erasure of the experiences and perspectives of those most injured by the very object of their studies, the West and its form of 'global' sovereignty. Given how swiftly Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded and occupied and how enthusiastically the bombing of Libya was undertaken, the meaning of sovereignty in the 'post' colonial era demands urgent attention, as much for effective political action as for theoretical consideration. I have argued that the two theories of sovereignty discussed above-despite their popularity-are seriously limited by their lack of engagement with the central problematic of sovereignty, namely, the racial logic of power that gives it shape within the global order.
The dismantling of the British and French Empires in the midtwentieth century contributed to a widespread belief that the age of colonialism had passed. Although settler societies including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel remained stubbornly colonial in the 'postcolonial' era, direct colonial rule was nonetheless seen by many as a relic of the past, a view reproduced implicitly in Homo Sacer and explicitly in Empire. The invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq have proved such expectations premature. Analyzed from the historical experience of the West's Other, the 'bare life' identified by Agamben is human life racialized as unworthy of the name, the 'state of exception' has been constituted as coloniality by an explicitly racial logic of power. Likewise, the 'expansionary' and 'inclusive' form of postmodernist sovereignty celebrated by Hardt and Negri continues to bequeath genocidal violence to Empire's most subjugated populations. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the Editors for their invaluable comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (Canada) for funding the research project on which this paper is based.
Notes 1 As Agamben explains:
The exception is a kind of exclusion. What is excluded from the general rule is an individual case. But the most proper characteristic of the exception is that what is excluded in it is not, on account of being excluded, absolutely without relation to the rule. On the contrary, what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule's suspension. The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension. In this sense, the exception is truly according to its etymological root, taken outside (ex capere), and not simply excluded. (1998, pp. 17-18) 2 Agamben outlines the crux of his own thesis in the following manner:
The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoë in the polis -which is, in itself, absolutely ancient -nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life -which is originally situated at the margins of the political order -gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoë, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested. When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the organization of State power and emancipation from it. Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a living being presents himself no longer as an object but as the subject of political power. These processes -which in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict with each other -nevertheless converge insofar as both concern the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity. (1998, p. 9) a reference to the 'real', a claim that I believe most critical race scholars would find difficult to accept. 4 Falguni Sheth (2009) also makes this critique in her engagement with Agamben. However, my approach differs from Sheth's engagement with this particular aspect of Agamben's work in a number of significant ways. As mentioned above, Sheth's study of the relation of race to sovereignty and liberalism defines 'race' as referring to something 'real' which gives rise to a disruptive 'unruliness' that has to be managed by the state in its reproduction of its own existence. My approach to 'race' defines this as co-constitutive of modernity and central to the constitution of sovereignty with its legal and juridical institutions, as well as to the making of different kinds of modern subjects with their specific forms of subjectivity. I do not take 'race' to refer to something 'real' in the world; I do not find the concept of 'unruliness' or 'madness' useful in explaining processes of racialization; nor do I take the existence of the state and nation as pre-existing entities that are disrupted by 'outsiders'. 'State', 'nation' and 'outsiders' are all mutually constituted through the racial logic of modern power. Moreover, Sheth studies 'race' by way of Heidegger's work on technology and Foucault's on biopower, while I find it an impossible proposition to theorize race in the absence of engagement with the tradition of critical race theory, which includes W. E. B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Frederick Douglass, among many others. 5 In Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada, I examine the triangulated racial/colonial relation among 'nationals', 'Indians' and 'immigrants', naming as 'exaltation' the technique of governance that shapes national identity in the context of the white settler society that is Canada. 6 Non-Jewish populations were also killed by the Nazi regime, including Roma, Polish, Slavish, Russian and other European civilians, Soviet and other prisoners of war, communists, homosexuals, and people with disabilities. Estimates of those killed in addition to 6 million Jews range between 5-11 million (see Niewyk & Nicosia 2000) . 7 Ryn and Klodzinski offer the following explanation for the use of the name 'Muslim' for the most dejected Jewish inmates of the camps:
They excluded themselves from all relations to their environment. If they could still move around, they did so in slow motion, without bending their knees. They shivered since their body temperature usually fell below 98.7 degrees. Seeing them from afar, one had the impression of seeing Arabs praying. This image was the origin of the term used at Auschwitz for people dying of malnutrition: Muslims. (Quoted in Agamben 2002, p. 43) drew upon. When in 1920 the anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elder of Zion appeared in German, it sold 120,000 copies by the end of the year…' (See Aberbach 1999, p. 31) . 10 For some excellent responses to Empire, see Passavant and Dean (2004); and Panitch and Leys (2004) . 11 Although Empire was written before the attacks of 9/11, Michael Hardt argued in an essay written after the attacks that 'nation-states are no longer sovereign, not even the United States', and that the 'rhetoric of US leaders since the events [of 9/11], however, has been based on a nostalgia for the era of national sovereignty' (See Hardt 2002) . 12 'In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, imperialism contributed to capital's survival and expansion', argue Hardt and Negri:
The partition of the world among the dominant nation-states, the establishment of colonial administrations, the imposition of trade exclusives and tariffs, the creation of monopolies and cartels, differentiated zones of raw material extraction and industrial production, and so forth all aided capital in its period of global expansion. Imperialism was a system designed to serve the needs and further the interests of capital in its phase of global conquest. And yet, as most of the (communist, socialist and capitalist) critics of imperialism have noted, imperialism also from its inception conflicted with capital. It was a medicine that itself threatened the life of the patient. Although imperialism provided avenues and mechanisms for capital to pervade new territories and spread the capitalist mode of production, it also created and reinforced rigid boundaries among the various global spaces, strict notions of inside and outside that effectively blocked the free flow of capital, labor, and goods -thus necessarily precluding the full realization of the world market. (2002, p. 332) As Hardt and Negri explain it, 'Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries' (2002, p. xii) . Most juridical theorists of the international order and sovereignty tend to follow two main theoretical traditions, they note: the Hobbesian view that 'focuses primarily on the transfer of the title of sovereignty and conceives the constitution of the supranational sovereign entity as a contractual agreement grounded on the convergence between pre-existing state subjects', with power 'primarily concentrated in the hands of the military' and the Lockean view that focuses more on the decentralized and pluralist networks of 'global constitutionalism' that constitute a 'global civil society ' (2002, p. 7) . While the former defines state sovereignty as monarchic power and the latter in its liberal variant, both views use their frameworks for explaining the 'domestic' state to interpret the supranational power. Neither, then, is capable of grasping the paradigm shift that shapes the 'new nature of imperial power ' (2002, p. 7) . Empire goes on to argue that what distinguishes this new power is that competition and conflicts between imperialist powers has 'been replaced by the idea of a single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist ' (2002, p. 9) . Their point of departure is thus 'a new notion of right, or rather, a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts ' (2002, p. 9) .
'Necessity is entirely a matter for the Security Council with only one exception: the strictly limited right of self-defence' (2003, p. 119) . The US claimed the right to defend itself in launching this war, and Mandel examines this right to self-defence that is enshrined in the UN Charter. He notes that the right depends on four factors: it is a temporary right until the UN can intervene; the state attacked can only be the one that carried out the initial attack; there be an element of necessity; and the attack conducted in selfdefence is proportional to the initial attack (2003, p. 121) . By these criteria, Mandel concludes that the US war in Afghanistan is illegal and violates the UN Charter. He goes on to make the following case:
The Security Council passed two resolutions on terrorism between September 11 and America's attack on Afghanistan on October 7 (SR 1368 of September 12 and SR 1373 of September 28). It's hard to see how any honest reading of these resolutions could possibly conclude that they authorize the use of force. They condemn the attacks of September 11 and take a whole host of measures to suppress terrorism, especially SR 1373 which has two dozen operative paragraphs outlining legislative, administrative and judicial measures for the suppression of terrorism and its financing, and for co-operation between states in security, intelligence, investigations and criminal proceedings. The resolution sets up a committee of all its members to monitor progress on the measures in the resolution and has given all states 90 days to report back to it. But not once does either of these resolutions mention military force or anything like it. They don't even mention Afghanistan by name. Nor do they use the accepted formula "all necessary means" of Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 by which the Security Council authorized the Gulf War of 1991. (Mandel 2003, p. 119 ) 22 Mandel expands on this right of self-defence:
In the first place, and most importantly, the right of unilateral self-defence (viz. not authorized by the Security Council) in Article 51 is expressly stated as a temporary right. There is simply no getting around the word "until". It is limited to the right to repel an attack that is actually taking place or to dislodge an illegal occupier (in Kuwait's case Iraq remained a military occupation of Kuwait throughout). This temporary right of self-defence does not include the right to retaliate once an attack has stopped. Nor does it include the right to overthrow the government one holds in some way responsible for the attack, or to undertake long-term preventive measures of a military nature. The idea is there for all to see in black and white in Article 51. A state is allowed to exercise self-help when there is not time for the Security Council to intervene and until it can intervene. The right of self-defence in international law is like the right of self-defence in domestic law; it allows you to defend yourself when the law is not around, but it does not allow you to take the law into your own hands. It defies the imagination how one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council -one who has indeed voted for the extensive, non-violent anti-terrorism measures taken by the Security Council -could justify a long, open-ended "war against terrorism" on the ground that the Security Council has not had time to intervene. (2003, p. 121) 24 Describing the Arab League as 'another arm of US imperial power', Joseph Massad points out that in the case of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, the League did not intervene under 'US instructions'. However, it did so in the cases of Libya and Syria. Massad argues that the propaganda campaign by the US and other Western powers, as well as the compliant Gulf States, played a crucial role in the Libyan case:
It was in Libya where the lies and propaganda started from the first week of the revolt. It was there that international forces, extending from the Gulf, to Europe to the US, took charge of propagandising against Gaddafi (that he used his forces to strafe demonstrators, that his forces received Viagra and raped hundreds of women, that he used "African" mercenaries against his own people, that he was preparing to use chemical weapons against his people, that he had already killed 50,000 Libyans, etc. -all proved to be lies that international observers and agencies finally exposed as baseless fabrications) and ultimately of overthrowing Gaddafi's dictatorship under the guise of the popular uprising led by NATO forces who actually bombed and killed hundreds of Libyan civilians. (Massad 2011) 
